The latest annual report [
PDF] of the Inspector General of Intelligence & Security (IGIS) indicates that
During 2012-13 I commenced five full inquiries:
• an inquiry into a complaint by an ASIO
employee about the loss of their security
clearance
• an inquiry into the attendance of legal
representatives at ASIO interviews
• an inquiry into the use of weapons and selfdefence
techniques in ASIS
• an inquiry into the analytic independence of
assessments by ASIO, DIO and ONA
• an inquiry into the actions of Commonwealth
agencies in respect of an Egyptian irregular
maritime arrival who was placed in
immigration detention and was the subject of
an Interpol red notice.
The first inquiry is described thus -
Inquiry into a complaint by an ASIO employee about the loss of their security
clearance
An ASIO employee lodged a complaint disputing the grounds upon which the Director-General
of Security had issued them with a notice of intention to withdraw their security clearance. This
decision would have the effect of terminating the complainant’s employment.
After a preliminary review of ASIO’s records relating to this matter, I decided to inquire both
specifically into the complaint made by the employee, and more broadly into matters relating
to their management by ASIO.
In relation to withdrawal of the security clearance, I found that the decision to withdraw the
employee’s clearance was not inappropriate.
Three recommendations were made in respect of ASIO’s staff management processes:
Two related to classified security vetting and risk management matters, which cannot
be detailed in this report. ASIO has advised me that one recommendation has been
fully implemented and the other is being actively progressed through the Australian
Government Inter-Agency Security Forum.
The third recommendation concerned the creation and retention of performance appraisal
records for ASIO staff. ASIO advised me that a new IT system was introduced in late 2012
which is intended to hold performance expectations and capability plans for every staff
member. In early 2012, approximately 60 per cent of ASIO employees had documented
performance expectation records. By the end of 2012-13, this figure had risen to 76 per cent.
In relation to 'analytic independence' IGIS states that -
Analytic independence of ASIO, DIO and ONA
During the reporting period I conducted an inquiry into the analytic independence of ASIO, DIO
and ONA.
My office has previously conducted this type of inquiry in respect of ONA and DIO. This is the
first such review of ASIO’s assessment activities, providing a baseline that will inform future
inquiries.
The inquiry included:
• examination of relevant agency policy and procedures
• a self-assessment by each agency of their performance relating to assessment activities
• examination of a selection of intelligence assessments and associated records
• examination of staff surveys
• an open letter inviting analysts to contribute to the inquiry.
The general picture of the independence of assessment activities across the three agencies is
a positive one. There was no evidence of inappropriate pressure being placed on any of the
agencies to reach a particular position.
While the overall finding is positive, the inquiry found inconsistent recordkeeping and
source referencing in ASIO and DIO. The inquiry recommended improvement to policies,
procedures and training in ASIO and DIO so that these agencies can consistently demonstrate
that their assessments are free from interference or bias. Both agencies have accepted these
recommendations.
DIO is expecting to implement a new electronic intelligence production system in July 2013.
Provided that the new system is consistently utilised to capture records in the way in which it
has been designed, there should be a significant improvement in DIO recordkeeping.
As a result of this inquiry, ASIO is developing a new policy on referencing and has made
improvements to electronic records systems to make it easier for analysts to consistently record
supporting documentation. Training for analysts has also been revised to incorporate methods
for documenting the material that has been considered when making assessments.
The inquiry also noted that ASIO and DIO did not conduct formal reviews of key judgements
to see whether there were any lessons that could be learnt and did not have written policies
relating to the management of dissent. In response to this inquiry, both agencies have taken
steps to formalise their processes for taking account of dissenting views and are considering
possible mechanisms for the review of key judgements.
No recommendations were made with regard to ONA.
Inquiries underway at the end of the reporting period are characterised thus -
Inquiry into the attendance of legal
representatives at ASIO interviews
ASIO cannot prevent an individual requiring the
presence of their lawyer at a voluntary interview.
Where an interviewee requires the presence of
their lawyer, ASIO requests the contact details of
the lawyer and their firm, as well as an undertaking
of confidentiality. However, if interviewing
officers assess that the presence of the lawyer
is counterproductive to the conduct of the
interview, they may inform the interviewee and, if
appropriate, terminate the interview.
In last year’s annual report, I reported on a
complaint by a state legal aid commission that
a client had been denied the right to a legal
representative during an ASIO visa security
assessment interview. I noted that the complaint
highlighted ASIO’s responsibility to clarify the
role of any support person. In March 2013 I
received a separate complaint alleging arbitrary
decision making by ASIO officers in relation to
the attendance of legal representatives at security
assessment interviews.
I conducted a preliminary inquiry into the new
complaint, to identify if ASIO procedures had
changed since my previous inquiry and to
ascertain whether ASIO’s decisions were being
carefully considered and documented in each
instance, with sufficient notice of interview
arrangements being given to interviewees.
I identified some inconsistencies between ASIO
records and those of the complainant, and some
potential issues in relation to communication
between ASIO and the Department of Immigration
and Citizenship (DIAC) and consequently decided
to initiate a full inquiry.
The inquiry was ongoing at the end of the
reporting period and will be reported in the 2013-
14 IGIS annual report.
Inquiry into the use of weapons in ASIS
It has now been almost ten years since the
Intelligence Services Amendment Act 2004 was
passed permitting the Minister for Foreign Affairs
to approve the provision of a weapon or training in
the use of a weapon or in self-defence techniques
to a specified staff member or agent of ASIS, or the
holder of a specific position in ASIS.
In April 2013 I commenced an inquiry into the
provision of weapons and the training in and use
of weapons and self-defence techniques in ASIS.
This inquiry has not been prompted by any
particular concern; rather, it was always intended
that this provision be subject to close oversight by
my office. The inquiry will review compliance by
ASIS with the legislation and relevant guidelines
and will examine:
• authorisations
• training
• procurement, issuing, storage, transportation
and carriage of weapons
• reportable incidents.
Further details of the inquiry will be included in
the 2013-14 IGIS annual report
Inquiry into the matter of an Egyptian irregular
maritime arrival
On 5 June 2013, the then Prime Minister wrote
to me requesting that I conduct an inquiry into
the matter of an Egyptian irregular maritime
arrival who arrived in Australia in May 2012, was
placed in immigration detention in Australia and
was the subject of an Interpol red notice. The
Prime Minister also requested that I consider
and make recommendations more generally
on the management by Australian agencies of
persons seeking asylum who present complex
security issues.
I commenced the inquiry on 6 June 2013 and
notified relevant ministers and agency heads
of the inquiry, as required by the IGIS Act. My
letters to the Director-General of Security, the
Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police and
the Secretary of the Department of Immigration
and Citizenship included a notice requiring that
they produce relevant documents.
The purpose of the inquiry is not to establish
whether the identified individual posed a threat
to security but rather to look at whether the
relevant agencies had, and followed, appropriate
procedures to identify, assess and manage any
such threat.
At the end of the reporting period the inquiry was
at an early stage.
IGIS initiated five preliminary inquiries into
matters raised in complaints -
• a complaint by an AIC employee in receipt
of an adverse security assessment, which
would have the effect of terminating their
employment. I closed this preliminary inquiry
after determining that there had been no
unreasonable action by any AIC agency
• an allegation of detriment to a member of the
public arising from an interview by ASIO
• an anonymous complaint about lack of
action by ASIS management on allegations of
misconduct
• a complaint about delay following an Archives
Act 1983 request for access to ASIO files
• a complaint by a refugee advocacy service
alleging arbitrary decision making by ASIO
officers in relation to the attendance of
legal representatives at security assessment
interviews. I closed this preliminary inquiry
after deciding that the matter could be more
appropriately considered under the powers
and protections of a full inquiry
