18 March 2014

Evidentiary Thresholds and the INSLM

The Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee inquiry is conducting an inquiry (with submissions by 28 March!) into "the current investigative processes and powers of the Australian Federal Police in relation to non-criminal matters".

In essence, the inquiry is a response to disquiet over the ineptly handled investigation into allegations that the Seven Network had made a substantial payment to celebrity criminal Chapelle Corby or her family, contrary to the Australian proceeds of crime regime.

The Committee is to cover
(a) thresholds, including evidentiary thresholds, relating to the obtaining of production orders and search warrants, and in particular whether these reflect the rules applicable to civil litigation discovery rather than coercive search; 
(b) procedures preparatory to seeking production orders and search warrants, including taking into account the conduct of the recipient of such orders; 
(c) procedures for executing search warrants; 
(d) safeguards relating to the curtailment of freedom of speech, particularly in relation to literary proceeds matters; 
(e) safeguards for ensuring the protection of confidential information, including journalists' sources, obtained under search warrants, and particularly where that information does not relate to the search warrant; 
(f) the powers available to the Australian Federal Police to intercept telecommunications in circumstances where the matter being investigated does not involve criminal conduct; 
(g) the priorities of the Serious and Organised Crime Division, and the circumstances under which they should appropriately be deployed in relation to non-criminal matters; and  
(h) any related matters.
The Government has meanwhile foreshadowed abolition of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM) as part of its 'war on red tape).

Reporting by Brett Walker SC, the INSLM, has been noted and commended elsewhere in this blog. Abolition is deeply regrettable. It will not save substantial money and, more significantly, will reduce a source of cogent advice to both the Executive and community at large regarding Australia's national security law. Reporting by the INSLM fosters the trust that is fundamental for national security (inc counter terrorism) activity and law enforcement in a liberal democratic state.

We should decry the failure of the current and preceding Government to respond to a succession of sensible and moderate recommendations by the INSLM. The Monitor should be encouraged and strengthened rather than abolished, noting the INSLM's comment that
The functions of the INSLM go no further than review, report and recommendation. The INSLM Act was enacted explicitly in recognition of the grave threat of terrorism and the significance of widespread concerns that the best balance be struck by Australia’s legislation to counter terrorism. When there is no apparent response to recommendations that would increase powers and authority to counter terrorism, some scepticism may start to take root about the political imperative to have the most effective and appropriate counter-terrorism laws. That would be, in the opinion of the INSLM, a regrettable atmosphere in which future and continued assessment and improvement of Australia’s CT Laws are undertaken.